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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee
Case No. 20020478-CA
vs.
MARC W. SCHUMACHER,
Defendant/Appellant

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF IRON COUNTY
5th DISTRICT
HON. J. PHILIP EVES, JUDGE

Marc W. Schumacher
PO Box 287
1782 East 2900 North
Paragonah, UT 84760
435-559-7172
Appellant, pro se
Paul Bittmenn
Assistant Prosecuting Attorney
PO Box 421
Cedar City, UT 84721
Attorney for Appellee
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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
00O00

State of Utah,
Plaintiff and Appellee,

JUL ! 2 z;.v
Pauletie Stagg
Cierk of the C&urt

ORDER

v.
Case No. 20020478-CA
Marc William Schumacher,
Defendant and Appellant.

This case is before the court on the State's motion for
summary disposition pursuant to rule 10(a)(2) of the Utah Rules
of Appellate Procedure. The State did not cite any legal
authority or file a memorandum of law in support of the motion.
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the State's motion for summary
disposition is denied and deferred pending plenary presentation
and consideration of the appeal.
DATED t h i s
^«JfiTTHfe COURT

n

day of July, 2002

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that on July 12, 2002, a true and correct copy
of the foregoing ORDER was deposited in the United States mail to
the parties listed below:
SCOTT M. BURNS
IRON COUNTY ATTORNEY'S OFFICE
97 N MAIN STE 1
CEDAR CITY UT 84720
MARC W. SCHUMACHER
PO BOX 257
PARAGONAH UT 847 60
Dated this July 12, 2002.

AAJ^J^T)

By/2:
De^putxf C l e r k
Caste No.

20020478
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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
This Court has jurisdiction under UCA Section 78-2a-3 and Rule 5,
Rules of the Utah Court of Appeals.

NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS
Defendant/Appellant's Motion to Suppress was denied in the trial
court. As part of the Defendant/Appellant's plea, the issue of the validity of
the stop by the police officer has been preserved for appeal and is now
taken.

ISSUE
Can a police officer, who hears about a vehicle running a stop sign
but does not personally observe it, legally stop that vehicle and conduct an
investigation without reasonable suspicion of criminal activity?
Appellant answers: "NO"
Appellee answers: "YES"
The standard of review is correctness.

1

DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL AND
STATUTORY PROVISIONS

The following constitutional and statutory provisions are determinative of the issue presented for appeal in this cause:

AMENDMENT IV, CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures,
shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon
probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or
things to be seized.
ARTICLE I. SECTION 14, CONSTITUTION OF UTAH
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures
shall not be violated; and no warrant shall issue but upon
probable cause supported by oath or affirmation, particularly
describing the place to be searched, and the person or
thing to be seized.
UCA Section 77-7-15
A peace officer may stop any person in a public place when he
has reasonable suspicion to believe he has committed or is in
the act of committing or is attempting to commit a public offense
and may demand his name, address and an explanation of his actions.
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NATURE OF THE CASE

Appellant was charged with "DIM" and "Open Container" in the
Iron County Circuit Court. The evidence available to the State to support
prosecution was discovered as a result of a traffic stop and subsequent
investigation and search of the vehicle. Appellant claims the stop was
unconstitutional and all evidence gathered therefrom should be excluded.

COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS
The Appellant filed a Motion to Suppress which was denied on
November 29, 2001. On April 29, 2002, Appellant pled "no contest" to the
DUI with the right to appeal the legality of the stop.

RELEVANT FACTS

Brent Dunlap, an undercover Narcotics Task Force Officer working in
his own vehicle (T. page 17, lines 1-6), responded to a radio communication
from Dispatch which received a call reporting "suspicious activity" in a
parking lot involving an older green pick-up truck.

Agent Dunlap saw

Appellant in the parking lot in front of his green truck with the truck's hood
up. The officer observed Appellant close the hood and get into his truck.
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Agent Dunlap testified that there was nothing suspicious or unusual about
Appellant's behavior (T. page 18, lines 16-21).
Appellant then drove out of the parking lot at an unknown rate of
speed with Agent Dunlap in his unmarked vehicle following. There was no
testimony that Appellant was speeding; according to the Officer: "I wasn't
able to get a good pace on him" (T. page 19, line 19).
As Appellant approached a stop sign at the corner of Sage Drive and
600 South "...the vehicle did slow down but it failed to make a complete
stop at the stop sign." (T. page 19, line 20).
The Appellant continued eastbound on 600 South for approximately
one mile where he was pulled over and arrested by a different officer;
Officer Mike Russell, of the Cedar City Police Department.
The arresting officer, Mike Russell, testified that he did not observe
the failure to stop at the sign (T. page 8, lines 22-25) yet he is the one who
stopped Appellant's vehicle. He testified that he was the one who stopped
the Appellant and he made the stop because he heard over the radio that a
green pick-up truck had run a stop sign (T. page 9, lines 1-4). After he
stopped Appellant and conducted an investigation, Officer Russell issued a
citation for DUI and "open container".
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There was no testimony from either officer that Appellant was
weaving, driving erratically, or even driving at an excessive speed.
There was no testimony of any suspicious activity. There was no testimony
of any suspected criminal activity.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The only testimony elicited from either officer which would give rise
to the issuance of any citation was the failure to come to a complete stop.
An officer may not stop a vehicle for a traffic violation unless he
personally witnessed that violation. Absent a personal observation of a
traffic violation, a vehicle may not be stopped unless there is "reasonable
suspicion" of criminal activity.
Here, Officer Russell did not witness the failure to stop at the stop
sign and there was no suspicion at all, let alone "reasonable suspicion", of
criminal activity.
Consequently, the stop was a 4 th Amendment violation and the
evidence gathered therefrom must be excluded.
DETAIL OF ARGUMENT
A brief stop of a citizen by a law enforcement officer, even though
the detention is brief and the purpose merely investigatory, to be lawful,
requires that the officer have "specific, articulable facts" that reasonably
5

warrant suspicion that a crime has occurred or is being committed; United
States v. Briqnoni-Ponce, 422 US 873 (1975).
This "reasonable suspicion" standard is ground in the Fourth
Amendment, Constitution of the United States, and Article I, Section 14,
Constitution of Utah: State v. Trujillo, Utah, 739 P. 2nd 85; and, State v.
Mendenhall, 446 US 544, (1980). Brief, public, and investigatory stops,
which fall short of traditional arrest, are governed by this standard: Terry v.
Ohio, 392 US 1 (1968). No distinction in such an investigatory stop is
made between that of a pedestrian and the stop of a vehicle: Delaware v.
Prouse, 440 US 649 (1979); and, State v. Sierra, 754 P. 2nd 972 (Utah
App.1988); State v. Marshall, 791 P. 2nd 880 (Utah App. 1990); State v.
Talbot, 792 P. 2nd 489 (Utah App. 1990); and, State v. Lopez, 873 P. 2nd
1127 (Utah 1994).
Recently, the 10th Federal Circuit Court reiterated the rule that the
constitutionally mandated prerequisite for investigative detention is a
reasonable suspicion of criminal activity: Oliver v. Woods, 209 F. 3rd 1179
(10 th Circuit, 2000).

The trial Court agreed with the State's argument that there was in
fact "reasonable suspicion" for the stop because the informant who observ-
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ed the failure to stop was a member of a drug task force operation and was
thus "reliable/' The informant's reliability is immaterial inasmuch as the
case law cited by the State applies only to crimes - specifically each
and every case cited by Respondent involves felonies. The standard for the
stop of a felony is entirely different from the standard required for the stop
of someone who has been observed doing something that does not even
rise to a misdemeanor. Each and every applicable Utah case states that a
stop for a non-criminal traffic infraction is justified only if the officer
personally observed the traffic violation: State v. Hansen, 17 P, 3rd 1135
(Utah App. (2000); Sandy City v. Thorsness, 778 P. 2nd 1011 (Utah App.
1989); Lopez, supra; Talbot, supra; Sierra, supra; and Marshall, supra.
In addition to the felony case law, the trial court relied on Utah
Criminal Code 77-7-15 to support its decision. However, Utah Criminal
Code section 77-7-15 does not apply to running a stop sign (the informant's
only observed infraction, according to the testimony); it applies only to
criminal infractions.

There is not a single Utah case which even suggests that the
procedures and rules promulgated in Chapter 7, specifically 77-7-15
apply to non-criminal infractions. On the contrary, each and every case
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interpreting this law indicates that it aplies only to crimes:
The reasonable, articulable suspicion contemplated
in this section (77-7-15) must be based on objective
facts suggesting the individual may be involved in
criminal activity." State v. Menke, 787 P. 2nd 537 (1990).
In order to conclude that there was reasonable suspicion
to justify stopping defendant an officer must be able to
articulate some unlawful or suspicious behavior connecting
the detainee to the suspected criminal activity. State v.
Potter, 863 P. 2nd 40 (1993).
See also: Sierra, supra.
The language of 77-7-15 uses the term "a public offense". This
terminology can only mean criminal activity, to wit:
While standing on Main Street waiting for a parade, an officer
hears a man make an off-color joke in a normal voice but loud
enough that women and youngsters could hear it. Someone
may be offended by the joke, and it was made on a public street.
The man leaves and gets into a older green truck. The officer,
being from another jurisdiction or otherwise unable or unwilling to
act, telephones the local police describing the truck. The police
send a cruiser in pursuit.
Clearly the cruiser would not be able to constitutionally stop the
truck. The driver committed a "public offense" but he did not commit a
crime.
If the term "public offense" in 77-7-15 was interpreted literally and
construed to mean any behavior which someone might deem offensive,
save for criminal behavior, the language is overly broad and therefore
unconstitutional.
8

CONCLUSION AND RELIEF SOUGHT

Simply put, there was nothing for the Arresting officer to investigate
he did not witness the traffic violation and he had no suspicion of any
criminal activity. Without something to investigate, his stop, investigation
and search were illegal and the fruits therefrom should be excluded.
Consequently, the Appelle prays for an ordersupressing all evidence
gathered from the illegal search and dismissal of the charges of " D i l l " and
"Open Container".
^spectfully^u^mitted,

MARC W . SpHUMACHER
P. 0. BOX 267
1752 East 2900 North
Paragonah, Utah 84760
435-559-7172
Acknowledgment of Service:
On August 23, 2002, I received a copy of Appellant's Appeal Brief on
behalf of the attorney whose name and address ap^ai) below>
Signature:
Name:
Paul Bittmenn, Attorney for Plaintiff/Appellee
Box 428
97 North Main Street - Suite #1
Cedar City, Utah 84720
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ADDENDUM
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IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR IRON COUNTY, STATE OF UT

^ILED
FEB 2 0 2002

STATE OF UTAH r

5th DISTRICT COURT,
IRON C O W —
DEPUTY CLERK.

)

Plaintiff,

)

) CASE NO. 015501427

VS
MARC WILLIAM SCHUMACHER.

)

Defendant.

)

BEFORE THE HONORABLE J. PHILIP EVES
FIFTH DISTRICT COURT
P.O. Box 608
Parowan, Utah 84761
REPORTER'S TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS

MOTION TO SUPPRESS

OCTOBER 29, 2001

TRANSCRIBED BY: Russel D. Morgan

COPY

BY MR. BITTMENN:
Q

Okay.

So you were around Cedar High?

A

Correct.

Q

And what drew your attention to the defendant's

I was westbound on 600 South towards Cinema

8.

vehicle?
A

Two things.

One was the radio transmission from Agent

Dunlap, who was behind the suspect vehicle giving me reports on
direction of travel, that type of thing.

The second thing was

the truck matched the description that the dispatch had given
out.
Q

Okay.

Is there a stop sign on any corner around there?

A

Not on —

Q

Did you see him run the stop sign?

A

I did not.

Q

You didn't see him run the stop sign?

A

I did not.

Q

Okay.

not by Cedar High School, no.

How about 600 South and Sage Drive; did he run a

stop sign there?
A

According to Agent Dunlap's testimony, he would testify

to that.
Q

Okay.

So you didn't see him run a stop sign?

A

I did not.

Q

Did you pull him over?

A

I did.

That was information from Agent Dunlap.
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1

Q

Was it communicated to you that he had run a stop sign?

2

A

It was.

3

Q

How?

4

A

By radio transmission.

[5

Q

Okay.

\ 6

turn your —

And —

excuse me —

when you saw him, did you

were you in a police cruiser?

|7

A

I was.

J8

Q

And did you turn your lights and sirens on?

A

I did.

I

I made a U-turn on 600 South to follow the

10

vehicle and initiated the stop.

11

lights.

I turned on my overhead

M

Q

Okay.

a3

A

We had just passed Cedar High School.

How far did you have to follow him?
I believe Mr.

14

Schumacher did not pull his vehicle over until pretty much the

(L5

stop sign at 300 West 600 South.

I don't know how far that

would be.

b

Q

Okay.

b
f»

A

Maybe a couple hundred yards.

Q

So, not very far?

io

A

No.

I

Q

Did you make contact with Mr. Schumacher?

A

I did at that time.

v

ii
i

M
b

Q

Was he driving?

A

He was.

u

Q

How did you contact him, driver's side or passenger

lb

A

It's a Ford F250 extended cab, or heavy duty F250

four-wheel drive, undercover, unmarked.
Q

You are an undercover agent for the task force, aren't

A

Yes.

you?
I'm currently assigned to the Southern Utah

Regional Office through the State Bureau of Investigations.
Q

So wherever you go, you are in your vehicle?

A

Basically, yes.

I'm on-call 24 hours a day.

Basically, I'm in the vehicle most of the time.
Q

Okay.

Do you remember seeing the defendant in his

vehicle on that date?
A

Yes, I do.

Q

Where was that?

A

First I noticed the vehicle is in the Cinema 8

Theater's parking lot.

Dispatch had just put out an attempt to

locate on a suspicious vehicle at, inside the parking lot at
the Cinema 8 Theaters.

The information we received is a person

called in, stating that the truck had been there —
green pickup truck

an older

—

DEFENDANT SCHUMACHER:

Objection, Your Honor.

an area that's gone beyond the scope of the question.

This is
The

question was, when did you first observe the defendant.
THE COURT:

Sustained.

BY MR. BITTMENN:
Q

Okay.

So you saw him at the Cinema 8, right?
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A

Correct.

Q

Okay.

A

Cedar Dispatch put out an attempt to locate on a

Why were you at Cinema 8?

suspicious person sitting in an older green pickup.

The

reporting party informed Cedar Dispatch that the truck had been
there since approximately 3 p.m.

And it was shortly after

9 p.m. at the time of the phone call.
Q

Okay.

And how far away were you when you got the call

over dispatch?
A

I was taking exit 57, the northbound off ramp which is

on the south end of Cedar City.
Q

So you were right there?

A

Yeah, within a mile or two.

Q

And when you got to the Cinema 8 Theaters, what did you

A

I entered the parking lot on the south end, drove

see?

through the parking lot.
older green pickup I saw.

Mr. Schumacher's vehicle was the only
It was over in the northwest area of

the parking lot at the time.

His hood was up.

And there was

another car parked next to him.
Q

Okay.

Anything unusual there?

A

No.

Q

Okay.

A

It was the only older green pickup in the parking lot.

Q

Okay.

What drew your attention to him?

Could you observe him for a while?

18

A

As I was pulling through the parking lot, I saw he was

just shutting the hood of his vehicle.
and drove out of the parking lot.

He entered his vehicle

As he was exiting the

parking lot, he spun his tires a little bit, came out onto Sage
Drive headed northbound.
Q

Which road is sage Drive?

A

Pardon?

Q

Which road is Sage Drive?

A

It's the one on the east side of the theaters but on

the west side of 1-15.
itself.

It goes between the theaters and 1-15

Be the west side frontage road, basically.

Q

Okay.

So he spun his tires.

He started going which

A

Northbound.

Q

On Sage Drive?

A

On Sage Drive.

Q

Okay.

A

It appeared that he increased his speed.

way?

to get a good pace on him.

I wasn't able

As we approached the intersection

of 600 South Sage Drive, the vehicle did slow down, but it
failed to make a complete stop at the stop sign.
Q

Is that the one up on the hill?

A

Correct.

Q

So he didn't make a stop?

A

Correct.

19

